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PETITION FOR REHEARING ARGUMENT
I
INVALID SERVICE OF PROCESS
RENDERS THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT VOID
A
THE COURT'S DECISION MISAPPLIES
THE HOLDINGS OF GRANT VS LAWRENCE
AND REED VS REED
The

Court's

decision

ignores

the

long-standing

HOLDING of the Grant vs Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 Pac.
931

(1910) decision, by relying upon dicta

(as to a

"presumption" of law that a man's residence is where his

2

family lives) , inappropriately applied in only this case.
The operative text of Rule 4 does not utilize the term
"residence". It utilizes the term "usual place of abode":
a term which Grant vs Lawrence has, for over eighty-five
years, defined to be the place where the Defendant is
living at the time the service is made.
The Court's reliance upon Reed vs Reed, 8 06 P. 2d
1182 (Utah Supreme Court 1991), as being dispositive to
this case, is similarly misplaced. First, Reed vs Reed
did not overrule Grant vs Lawrence, but supports it.
Second, the trial court in Reed made extensive written
findings of fact based upon an evidentiary hearing; in
the

instant

[because

case,

no

evidentiary

there were numerous

other

hearing

was

legal

issues

held
and

because the Defendant's residence out of the state of
Missouri had been previously acknowledged by Plaintiff's
counsel! Thirdly, in Reed there was considerable evidence
to show that the defendant was residing at the home of
his parents who received service for him and who were codefendants in that litigation, of which litigation the
defendant was made aware even before he was "served"!
Fourthly, in Reed, there was presented to the trial court
considerable
defendant's

evidence to affirmatively
actual

show that the

residence was, in fact, with his

parents and to rebut the Defendant's claim that he was

3

out of state; that conflicting evidence was resolved by
the

trial

court

against

the Defendant, who

actually

presented no evidence.
Lastly, in Reed the Utah Supreme Court, quoting a
federal court decision stated:
[N] o hard and fast rule can be fashioned to
determine what is or is not a party's "dwelling
house or usual place of abode" within the
rule's meaning; rather the practicalities of
the particular fact situation determine whether
service meets the requirements of 4(d)(1).
[T]he provision concerning usual place of
abode should be
[construed liberally] to
effectuate service if actual notice has been
received by the defendant and that in the last
analysis the question of service must be
resolved by "what best serves to give notice to
a defendant that he is being served with
process, considering the situation from a
practical standpoint.
806

P. 2d

at

. Bracketed

material

in

original.

Emphasis added.
In

the

instant

case,

the

Defendant's

affidavit

affirmatively states :
3 . I did
complaint
Missouri,
existence
action.

not receive a copy of the summons and
when I returned home to Appleton,
nor was I ever informed of the
of the summons and complaint in this

Emphasis added. Thus, under the language quoted from
Reed, above, the Defendant never received "actual notice"
of the instant action.
The most cogent reason why the service was defective
(in the context of defendant's motion to set aside the
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default judgment) is discerned from a careful reading of
the

Reed

decision.

In Reed,

the

defendant

ACTUALLY

APPEARED AND HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE THE MERITS OF
THE CASE, prior to the

"default

judgment" which was

ultimately entered against him. This fact alone, but
especially so when coupled with the extensive factual
findings entered by the trial court, distinguish Reed
from the case at bar! [While the Appellant herein is not
necessarily

arguing

for

a

"dual

standard"

as

what

constitutes valid service, the opportunity afforded the
defendant in Reed to actually litigate the merits of the
case certainly goes a long way to say that the Appellant
should be afforded that same opportunity!]
The Court's decision ignores not only the operative
holding of Grant vs Lawrence but also the numerous and
thoroughly-analytical statements explaining that holding.
It

is

incomprehensible

that

the

Court

would

now be

abandoning the time-honored standard, which is consistent
with the wording of Rule 4, in favor of a "presumption".
The issue here is not, per se, one of fact or proof.
Rather,

the

issue

is one of

law. The Defendant

has

asserted that he was not residing in Appleton, Missouri
at the time service was made; that he resided in Texas
hundreds of miles away. [It's physically impossible to
get

off

work,

drive

600 miles
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to Missouri

sleep

overnight

and then drive 6 00 more miles back to Texas,

to arrive at work at the begin of the next "work day".
The Defendant certainly ought to be entitled to the
reasonable inferences arising from the factual statements
within his Affidavit.] The only rebuttal the Plaintiffs
offered concerned the Defendant's attendance at a family
picnic at the Appleton, Missouri address in May 1992
over four months prior to the date of service. That the
Defendant attended the picnic in May does not mean that
he still resides there in September!
Grant vs Lawrence is absolutely clear in its holding
and the explanation for that holding: that "usual place
of abode" is a much more narrow term than "residence" (or
"legal residence") . Consequently, the Court's adoption of
the "presumption" approach is flawed: flawed because it
directly contradicts Grant vs Lawrence and flawed because
it does not adhere to the terms of Rule 4.
Furthermore, to allow the "presumption" to require
the Defendant's to establish

by affidavit or otherwise-

as to where he was (or wasn't) on a given date some
three years earlier) is unrealistic and inappropriate,
particularly in this case. That particular factual issue
was not directly in dispute; Plaintiffs' counsel
before service was made

even

acknowledged that the Defendant

was in Appleton only on weekends. [Service was made on a

6

Monday.] Secondly, the Defendant himself has explained
his work schedule: by any stretch of the imagination or
any reasonable mathematical calculation, the Appleton
residence was not his "usual place of abode", over the
short-run period, even though Mr Caldwell's family lived
there on a permanent basis.
It is incumbent upon the Plaintiff, as the moving
party in the litigation, to effect valid service of
process. If valid service is not effected, then any
judgment
judgment

entered

thereon

particularly

a

default

is void. The Plaintiff waited until literally

the "last minute"

the absolute "last minute" possible

under Plaintiffs' theory of the case
Unfortunately,

personal

service

to effect service.
upon

the

Defendant

himself was NOT made and the Missouri sheriff had to
leave the summons with Nikki Caldwell, the defendant's
i

wife! Unfortunately, that is not what Rule 4 AND Grant vs
Lawrence require. The service must be effected at the
place where the.Defendant is then living! That was Texas!
The whole purpose for the Rule is obvious: to insure
that THE DEFENDANT IN THE ACTION

NOT SOMEONE ELSE

gets the "summons" in a timely manner, ostensibly on the
very day it was served! To allow

(via the Court's

"presumption") the default judgment to stand in the face
of Defendant's assertions that his "usual place of abode"
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was in Texas AND that he was unaware of this proceeding
until the garnishment was effected upon him in September
1996 flies in the face of that logic and policy! The
Court must consider the realities of modern life in our
transient
distances,

society:
for

people

extended

conveniently
period

of

travel

time.

[In

long
the

Defendant's own case, he travels from state-to-state, at
jobs for his regular employer, performing environmental
clean-up activities at contaminated sites.] In former
times

when the "usual place of abode" criterion was

initially
decided

developed

and when Grant vs Lawrence was

people didn't move around much. They worked and

then went home. They seldom travelled. Consequently, it
was extremely likely that they would be made aware of
service of process effected at "their usual place of
abode" the very day that service was made! In today's
world, that may not be the case. As the instant situation
illustrates, the Defendant was living hundreds of miles
away

in Texas

when the service was made in Missouri.

In that context, it may be weeks before he returns to
Missouri. In that period of time, the "summons" could be
misplaced

and/or

inadvertently

discarded

and

the

Defendant might never know of the proceeding. Somebody
Nikki, one of the children, a visitor, we don't know who--in Appleton may have discarded the "summons". We do
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know that Mr Caldwell states, under oath, that he never
received

the

summons or notification

proceeding until the garnishment

of the

instant

action in September

1996! The Court's newly-adopted "presumption" rule now
penalizes Mr Caldwell for conduct which is not his fault:
for having employment out-of-state so that he doesn't
actually spend every night in the dwelling where his
family resides. Until now, it didn't matter; now, with
the

Court's

Lawrence

enforcement

holding

of

contrary

the

to

the

"presumption",

penalized! That's not right!

Grant
he

now

vs
is

[All that Mr Caldwell is

asking for in this case is to have "his day in court" on
the

pleaded

issues!]

In

these

modern

times,

it

is

extremely illogical for the Court to now be abandoning
or at least expanding

the time-proven "usual place of

abode" standard from Grant vs Lawrence! By so doing will
only further engender more "default judgment" claims,
appeals and controversy.
Furthermore, the Court must consider the relative
"equity"

(or inequity,

as

allowing certain defendants

the

case

actually

is)

in

who were personally served-

--to have the "default judgments" against them set aside
(ostensibly under

a

"discretion

of

the trial court"

standard) and not allowing THIS DEFENDANT who WAS NOT
PERSONALLY SERVED to set aside that default judgment.
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We are talking
case and as pleaded

under Plaintiffs' theory of the
here about the alleged "renewal" of

an earlier "judgment". The Plaintiffs have waited the
maximum

amount

attention

of

of
the

time

to bring

Defendant,

this matter

via

the

to the

garnishment

proceeding. The Plaintiffs will not, in that setting, be
prejudiced by the delay

which was entirely of their own

choosing

as far as the presentation of their theory of

the

is

case

appellate
set aside
personally

concerned.

If

the

courts

trial

or

have ever allowed a "default judgment" to be
in case where the defendant was
served,

then this Court

MUST,

actually,
for

equity

reasons, allow THIS default judgment to be set aside
because the defendant was NOT personally served!
B
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD REMAND
THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A PROPER APPLICATION OF
THE NEWLY-ANNOUNCED "PRESUMPTION" STANDARD
In the alternative, this Court should remand this
case back to the District Court for application of the
Court's newly-announced "presumption" standard, including
specific findings following an evidentiary hearing.
II
THE COURT'S DECISION IGNORES THE DEFENDANT'S
ANALYSIS OF THE RULE 54(c) (2) VIOLATIONS AND ISSUES
The Court's opinion asserts [p. 2 thereof] that the
Appellant

[Mr Caldwell] has not provided any "relevant
10

legal authority or

...

any helpful legal analysis

supporting his arguments" for the assertion that the
default judgment is defective, as being in violation of
Rule 54(c)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Appellant DID provide the Court with "legal
authority": the provision of Rule 54(c) (2), itself! The
application
methodically

of

those provisions

were

carefully

and

albeit not extensively, because this is a

simple situation

analyzed and applied to the situation

at hand, on pages 24 through 25 of the Appellant's
original brief and on pages 8 through 10 of the Reply
Brief. The Plaintiffs' non-compliance with the Rule is
facially discerned and established by the Plaintiffs' own
pleadings! To say that the Defendant did NOT provide this
Court with legal "authority" or "analysis" is erroneous!
The Rule itself

and its clear provisions

are the

"authority" possible! The Rule itself

as the

operative, original ("first-generation") text

is all

best

that is needed. An appellate court decision (a "case" or
"case-law support") is not for every assertion of law.
The

original

text

of

a constitution,

statute, or

validly-promulgated and long-standing rule of court

can

certainly be the "starting" and the "finishing" point of
any given analysis, particularly when that original text
is so clear, so unambiguous and so on point!
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In the face of such argument and "authority", the
Court's decision says, implicitly, that Rule 54(c)(2)
does NOT mean what it clearly says! The Court's decision,
by ignoring the issue, implicitly upholds an "evolution"
from

complaint

to

judgment

which

Rule

54(c) (2) was

expressly designed to prevent! The Court's decision must
expressly resolve this issue!
Ill
THE COURT'S DECISION IGNORES THE ISSUES
RAISED BY THE STEVENS VS COLLARD DECISION
The Court's decision totally ignores the standard
announced in Stevens vs Collard, 837 P. 2d 593 (Utah Court
of

Appeals

1992) : that

"default"

judgments

must

be

legally valid, on their face, and that before entering
such judgments the trial court must be satisfied of such
validity! These issues were validly raised at the trial
court level and have been preserved on appeal. These
issues should be resolved by this Court.
The default judgment is facially-flawed in several
particulars:
1.

Nelda Wall was not a party to the original

divorce
standing

proceeding
to

from

enforce

1983!

She

the provisions

has
of

no
that

divorce decree! [Only Plaintiff LAUREL CALDWELL
has standing to enforce the original divorce
"judgment".]

That the original action was a
12

divorce action is obvious from the face of the
Plaintiffs' pleadings: the pleading says so!
[Paragraph 3] Judge Noel should have known that
the "pay off the Hal Wall mortgage" provision
was not a "judgment" enforceable by NELDA WALL,
a stranger to the original divorce action!
2.

The provision in the 1983 divorce decree is

NOT

a

"judgment"

subject

to

"renewal"

[the

singularly-pleaded legal theory for Plaintiff
NELDA WALL] . This was acknowledged by Judge
Noel (of the trial court) and by Judge Billings
of this Court!
Court

would

microscopic

[It is incredible

"split

hairs"

scrutiny

of

and
the

that
engage

this
in

Appellant's

affidavit (i.e. as to where he was living, his
working schedule, and that he did NOT receive
the summons) and the inferences to be derived
therefrom

all for the purposes of depriving

him of "his day in court"

and to then IGNORE

this most basic legal issue! It's not fair;
it's not right. And it's certainly not what
Rule 54(c) (2) mandates or proscribes!
3-

The

Plaintiff

NELDA

WALL

was

NOT

the

Personal Representative of the Hal Wall estate;
she was not validly appointed and she simply
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has no "standing" to bring (via the originally
filed

complaint)

an action

to

enforce

the

"judgment" (sic) "in favor of the Estate of Hal
Wall", even if she is the surviving spouse!
Such should have been obvious to Judge Noel:
from the face of the pleading itself and from
the

"judicial

notice"

available

from

the

District Court's own records. [It is openly
acknowledged
probate

as

a FACT

proceeding

filed

that

there

in behalf

was NO
of

the

Estate of Hal Wall in the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County

(or any other

county)!]
Under Collard, the default judgment should have
never been signed or entered! That Judge Noel did not
initially discern the foregoing facial defects in the
proffered

"default

judgment"

when

such

was

first

presented to him is perhaps understandable: trial court
judges are undoubtedly very busy. Undoubtedly, trial
judges rely upon the integrity, professional competence
and compliance with the Rules by the counsel appearing
before them. In that setting, the "judgment" was signed
and entered! That does not excuse the Court of refusing
to set aside when Rule 54(c)(2) is brought

to its

attention. For this Court to implicitly condone what has
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been done
court

by Dotn i'laintiiii.v counsel and by the trial

• i.en "his issue was carefuJ

appeu.n L r. . >._ .;,

U/

pointed out to the

.•.;xp11 j ^ L - . . rne uourt' s decision

must also expressly resolve these issues.
'•

\'

'!

•••

•

KT

The Court's decision substitutes a newly-fashioned
"prp^" ••!•-:

: ' (

"

• • -""sol i s "i :es:i dence")

t : :i : ep] ace

and/or expand the time-proven criterion of "usual place
of abode" as incorporated into Rule 4 and -: • rernrefF. •
Lawrence vs Grant and more recently applied l.i. nt-^a vs
Reed. Such an expansion is improvident. In these modern
times, the Court si lould i lot be expanding the time-proven
criterion; rather it should be holdinq

to that time-

proven criterion.
The entered (and now-approved) iudgment is facially

of Collard have not been followed. The Court's opinion is

Court, Hi i.i.s mandate to dispense justice and fairness to
the parties before it, must address

(and correctly re-

address) tl lese issues I
Respectfully submitted this 25th day oi February,
/ ,

1998.
^

.

y
^

#
^

—

Attorney for Appellant
STEVEN D CALDWr T T.
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